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DISCOUNT OBLIGATIONS-CAPITAL GAIN
OR ORDINARY INCOME
MELVIN M. GREENBERG*

INIRODUCTION

The rise in ordinary income rates has resulted in a constant striving
by taxpayers to convert ordinary income into capital gain. One vehicle
utilized in an attempt to achieve this desired result is the discount
obligation.
A discount obligation is an obligation issued for a consideration less
than the amount of the debt. For example, a corporation may issue a
bond for $750, redeemable in tcu years at $1000. The bond may or
may not stipulate additional interest to be paid periodically. It must be
decided whether the difference between the consideration paid and the
debt due is capital gain or ordinary income. This question, although infrequently litigated, has been the subject of much confusion.
Section 1232 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unravelled the
puzzle for discount obligations issued after December 31, 1954.1 On the
sale or exchange2 of certain discount obligations, the gain attributable to
an original issue discount will be considered as gain from the sale or
exchange of property which is not a capital asset.3
What is the nature of the gain attributable to an original issue discount
realized on the sale or exchange or retirement of a discount obligation
issued on or before December 31, 1954? Under Section 1232, the applicable
statutory provision remains substantially unaltered 4 for obligations issued
on or before this date.
•LL.B University of Florida (1952), LL.M, N.Y.U. (1955); Member of Florida Bar.
1. INT. REV. CODA OF 1954 § 1232 superseded § 117 (f) of the INT. REv. ConE

OF

1939.

2. IN. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1232 (a) (1) characterizes a retirement of qualified
obligations as a "sale Or exchange." The provisions of § 1232 (a) (2) are therefore
equally applicable to retirements.
3. lr''. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1232 (a)(2)(A) provides as follows:
. . . upon sale or exchange of bonds or other evidence of indebtedness
issued after December 31, 1954, held by the taxpayer more than 6
months, any gain realized which does not exceed an amount which bears
the same ratio to the original issue discount . . . as the number of complete
months that the bond or other evidences of indebtedness was held by
the taxpayer bears to the number of complete months from the date of
original issue to the date of maturity, shall be considered as gain from
the sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset. Gain in excess
of such amount shall be considered gain from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset held more than 6 months.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1232 added the requirement that the obligation
be a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. For obligations issued after Dec. 31,
1954 it is no longer required that the obligation be issued either in registered form
or with interest coupons.

DISCOUNT OBLIGATIONS
This analysis is an examination of the problem as it existed under
Section 117(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939' and still exists
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Assume the following situation: A taxpayer purchases a bond issued
by a corporation 7 ; it is a capital asset in his hands. The bond is issued
to the taxpayer at an original discount. In the following transactions,
is ordinary income or capital gain realized by the taxpayer?
(1) The taxpayer holds the bond to maturity at which time the
corporation redeems it. The bond was not issued with interest
coupons or in registered form.
(2) The taxpayer holds the bond to maturity at which time the

corporation redeems it. The bond was issued either with
interest coupons or in registered form
(3) The taxpayer makes a bona fide sale of the bond to a third
party one day before maturity. In this situation it should
make no difference whether the bond was issued with interest
coupons or in registered form since there was an actual sale.
HYPOTHETICAL I: NON-COUPON, NoN-REISTERED BOND
REDEEMED AT MATURITY

Before a taxpayer may ever realize capital gain there must be a "sale
or exchange." 8 If there is no sale or exchange, the problem of ascertaining
whether the property disposed of is a capital asset becomes moot.
-Prior to the enactment of Section 117(f) 9 , there was some conflict
as to whether the redemption of a bond constituted a sale or exchange.
A few early decisions held that proceeds received by a holder upon
redemption were amounts received in exchange. 10 Subsequent decisions,
however, reversed the rule," and the Bureau followed the latter.12 Any doubt

concerning the law prior to Section 117(f) was finally dispelled by the
3
Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Fairbanks.1
There the Court held that Section 117(f) was not declaratory of preexisting law, but constituted a material addition to prior law and that
without Section 117(f), "payment and discharge of a bond is neither
sale nor exchange within the commonly accepted meaning of the words."1 4
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 117 (f).
6. Includes debentures, notes, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness.
7. Includes government or political subdivision therof.
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939 § 117 (a)(4).
9. Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 680.
10. Commissioner v. Werner, 15 B.T.A. 482 (1929); see also Averill v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1938).
11. 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932); see also Felin v. Kyle, 102 F.2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1939).
12. IT. 2678, XI-1 Cur. Bull. 117 (1933).
13. 306 U.S. 436 (1939).
14. Id. at 437.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Section 117(f) was first enacted in 1934'5 and has remained unchanged.
It read:
[A]mounts received by the holder upon the retircment of
bonds . . . issued by any corporation . . . with interest coupons

or in registered form shall be considered as amounts received in
exchange therefor."'
Thus, Congress declared a redempion to be equivalent to a sale or
exchange. The section, however, rLquircs that the bond be issued either
with interest coupons or ill registered form. The hypothetical situation
under discussion, in which the bond has no attached interest coupons nor
is in registered form, fails, therefore, to satisfy the express conditions
requisite to qualifying a transaction for the special treatment accorded by
Section 117(f). As previously noted, without the benefit of Section 117(f)
a redemption is not a sale or exchange, and without a sale or exchange
there cannot be capital gain.
Hence, it can be concluded that where a taxpayer holds until maturity
an unregistered bond without interest coupons, the gain realized upon
redemption is ordinary income.
HYPOTIETICAL

It:

COUPON OR REISTERED BOND

REDEEMED AT MATURITY

In this situation the bond falls within the definition of Section 117(f)
and therefore its retirement is characterized as a "sale or exchange." The
taxpayer here may realize gain as a result of an original discount. It is
arguable that this discount is equivalent to interest. If so, it would seem
that the general language of Section 117(f) falls short of converting what
otherwise would have been ordinary income into capital gain.
In Commssioner v. Caulkins,T the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit was confronted with a similar fact situation. There the taxpayer
had purchased a certificate prior to November 7, 1938, for $15,043.22 On
April 1, 1939, he surrendered the certificate and received $20,000, the
agreed redemption value. The issuing corporation reported the difference
as interest. The taxpayer deducted the realized gain as long term capital
gain. Concluding that the discount was essentially equivalent to interest,
the court stated:
. . . it is difficult to perceive any practical reason for taxing
increment of the type involved here differently from ordinary
income. The fact that the contract does not provide for equal
15. See note 9 supra.
16. See note 1 supra.

17. 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944).
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amounts of interest to be set aside each year, available to the
holder, does not affect the question. The increment is consideration paid for the use of the principal sum. Unfortunately for the
Commissioner's contention, Congress has not made the differentiation.' 8
The court reasoned that the language of Section 117(f) precluded any

other finding than that of capital gain:
In the present case, the promise was to pay $20,000 at the

expiration of the ten year period. Clearly $20,000 was the amount
received on the retirement of the certificate and under the9 plain
wording of Section 117(f), it was taxable as a capital gain.'
The Internal Revenue Service acquiesced 0 in the Caulkins decision.
Subsequent to the Caulkins case, however, the Treasury promulgated
Revenue Ruling 119.21 The latter ruling dealt with non-interest bearing
obligations of the State of Israel issued in registered form and sold at
a discount. The Treasury concluded that the gain realized on retirement
would be ordinary income notwithstanding Section 117(f) and the Caulkins
decision. The ruling rested on three major grounds which appear untenable. It equated the treatment accorded the discount on Series E
United States savings bonds with that to be accorded Israeli bonds. However there is a distinction. In the case of Series E bonds, the discoun
is treated as interest because of special legislation not applicable to the
discount on Israeli bonds.2 2 The Treasury Department assumed that gain
realized on retirement of state obligations issued at discount is treated as
interest.2 3 However, the Internal Revenue Service has vacillated in its
treatment of state bond discount, sometimes holding it to be capital gain,
not interest. 24 Finally, the effect of the ruling is to limit the Caulkins
case to its facts. There is no justification for any such limitation. An
acceptance of the Caulkins decision necessarily leads to capital gain treatment for any qualified discount bond. In 1955, the Service conceded that
the Caulkins rationale is general in its application 25 and withdrew
acquiescence.26 The Service will continue to treat such discount as
27
ordinary income.
The question remaining to be resolved is whether the Caulkins case
is to be followed or whether the 1955 revenue ruling reaches the correct
result.
18. Id. at 484.
19. Ibid.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
at 12.

I.T. 1711-1996 Cum. BUiLL. 5. (1944).
IR-Mimrn. 43 CUN. BULL. 112 (1952).
46 STAT. 19 (1930), 31 U.S.C, § 754 (1953).
G.C.M. 10452, XI-1 Cum. BULL. 18 (1932).
1-I Cum. BL.. 27 (1922).
Riv'v. RiL. 55-136, 1955 IrT. REV. BULtL. No. 11, at 12.
1955 INT. REv. BULL. No. 11, at 6.
See note 22 supra; see also REv. RoL. 55-135, 1953 INT. REv. Buu.. No. 11,

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Interest is taxable as ordinary income. - ' The term interest has been
defined by the Supreme Court, as, "compensation for the use or forbearance
of money." 29 Where a taxpayer purchases a bond at a discount the
increment received on retirement is compensation for the use of the money
borrowed. The discount is the cost of obtaining the loan and is the
equivalent of interest. It appears illogical to distinguish between a bond
bought at a discount and interest periodically paid or accrued. Both are
for the use or forbearance of money, the only difference being the method
of payment. This increment in value attributable to interest can be
30
separated from the capital investment.
The Caulkins decision held that the "plain wording" of Section
117(f) requires capital gain treatment. However the language of Section
117(f) does not require this conclusion. The court decided that since
"amounts received" are "considered as amounts received in exchange
therefor," the gain resulting must be capital gain. But such amounts
must still be received in exchange for a capital asset.3 1 If in the Caulkins
case the taxpayer had been a dealer in securities, it is plain that the
court would have found the gain to be ordinary income. There would
have been a sale or exchange, but not of a capital asset. 32 The words of
Section 117(f) merely determine that the retirement of a bond or other
security is to be treated as a "sale or exchange," it does no more.3 3 To
hold that the gain is capital, the discount must be a capital asset.
Having concluded that Section 117(f) merely furnishes the element
of "sale or exchange," the principles of Hort v. Commissioner,34 Helvering
v. Horst" and Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner6 should apply. In Hort,
a lessor received payment in consideration for cancelling a lease. The
court held that the payment was a substitute for rental payments and thus
it was ordinary income. The right to receive rental payments, though
property, was not considered a capital asset.
In Helvering v. Horst, the owner of a bond detached a negotiaable
interest coupon before its due date and gave the coupon to his son. The
court held that the assignment was not valid for tax purposes. The
coupon, a mere right to receive income, was not property and could not
be assigned by itself.
28. INr. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 22(a).
29. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939); accord. Old Colony R.R. v. Cornmissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932); U.S. v. Collier, 104 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1939); Estate
of Clarence E. Lehr, 18 T.C. 373 (1952).
30. Commissioner v. Tieselboek, 317 U.S. 399 (1943),
31. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1939 § 117(a) (4).
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 117(a)M(1)(A).
33. Committee reports do not explain the intent of INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 §
117 (f); 1 CuM. BULL. 554, 557.
34. 313 U.S. 28 (1940).
35. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
36. 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942).
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In Rhodes' Estate, the taxpayer owned 600 shares of stock in a corporation which had declared a dividend of twenty dollars per share. Before
the dividend was paid, the taxpayer sold the right to receive the dividend.
The court held that the taxpayer could not convert what would have been
ordinary income into capital gain.
A strong argument can be made that Helvering v. Horst and Rhode's
Estate are distinguishable from the facts in issue here. On retirement of
the bond, in this hypothetical, the taxpayer relinquished his right to the
entire property. In Horst, the taxpayer retained the bond, and in Rhodes'
Estate he kept the stock. In Helvering v. Horst, the Supreme Court distinguished its prior decision in Blair v. Commissioner 37 by stating that in
the Blair case the irrevocable assignment of the right to income from a
trust was an assignment of the equitable ownership of the corpus itself
and therefore valid. The Supreme Court, in Horst and Blair, was deciding
who was the taxable entity, the donor or the donee. The conclusion
reached was that where the right to receive income is assigned, the assignment will not be recognized unless the income-producing property is also
assigned. The determination that the right to receive income is not
property for tax purposes stands by itself. The Caulkins factual situation
comes within the rule of Fischer v. Commissioner" and Paine v. Cornmissioner,32 discussed under Hypothetical III.
Hence, when a bond issued either with interest coupons or in registered form is retired, the gain to its holder attributable to the discount
should be treated as ordinary income.
HYPOTHETICAL

III:

BOND SOLD IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MATURITY

Before the enactment of Section 117(f) the courts recognized that
certain sales prior to maturity could result in capital gain. In McKee v.
Commissioner,40 the taxpayer held two bonds as trustee. The bonds were
sold one day before maturity. It was held that the taxpayer was entitled
to favored treatment under Section 101 (a), the capital gain provision of the
1928 law.4 ' There was no discussion of the nature of the increase in
value. However, it appears from thy facts discussed that it was not interest.
The court was careful to point out that the interest coupons which had
matured were detached prior to sale. Capital gain treatment was also
accorded the gain realized from the sale of preferred stock prior to redemption by the corporation.4 2 Again there was no discussion concerning
the nature of the gain. The corporation had redeemed at par value; this
was in excess of the taxpayer's basis. The above cases are readily dis37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42,

300 U.S. 5 (1937).
209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954).
23 T.C. No. 48 (1955).
35 B.T.A. 239 (1937).
Revenue Act of 1928, § 101(z), 45 STAT. 791.
Hoby v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 980 (1943).
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tinguishable from the problem at hand. The increases in value do not
appear attributable to any right to income, but rather to an increase in
capital value.
In Fischer v. Commissioner,43 the taxpayer sold interest notes which
were in default both as to principal and interest. The unpaid interest
amounted to approximately $75,000. The taxpayer, being on a cash receipts
basis, reported the sum of $66,150.56 as a long term capital gain, that
being the amount realized on the sale in excess of the face value of the
notes. The Commissioner determined that the entire increment was
taxable as ordinary income. It must be recognized that the notes were
not purchased at a discount, but interest was payable periodically. The
court, relying on the Horst and Hort doctrine, held for the Commissioner.
In Paine v. Commissioner,4 the Tax Court was confronted with the
sale before maturity of a non-rcgistcred discount note. The court concluded that the increment was interest and that the sale was bona fide.
The taxpayer contended that the Caulkins case was controlling. In the
Caulkins case the Tax Court found that where a taxpayer held a registered
bond until maturity the gain realized was capital gain under Section 117(f).
lie argued that by selling the note before maturity he provided the "sale
or exchange" element otherwise furnished by Section 117(f). The court,
in holding that the gain realized was ordinary income, distinguished the
Caulkins decision. It reasoned that the Caulkins rule was limited to situations in which there was an actual retirement under Section 117(f). 1-laving distinguished the Caulkins case, the court cited Hort, Horst, Fisher
and Rhodes' Estate to support their finding of ordinary income. As
previously noted it is felt that Section 117(f) merely characterizes certain
retirements as sales or exchanges. Once this principle is accepted a conflict
between the Caulkins case and the Paine case becomes apparent.
The reasoning and conclusion of the Paine case seems to represent
the correct view. Where a taxpayer makes a bona fide sale of a discount
bond before maturity the gain attributable to the discount should be
ordinary income.
CONCLUSION

1) Where a non-coupon, non-registered bond is redeemed by the
corporation the gain realized by the holder is ordinary income.
2) A conflict arises when a coupon or registered bond is redeemed
by the corporation. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit have held that
the gain realized is capital gain, 45 while the Internal Revenue Service takes

4?. See note 38 supra.
44. See note 39 snPra.
45. Commissioner v. Caulkins, 1 T.C. 656 (1943)
Cit. 1944).

afJ'd 144 F.2d 482 (6th
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the position that the gain is ordinary income. 46 An audit of an income
tax return in which such a gain has been treated by the taxpayer as capital
gain will be certain to result in litigation if the taxpayer persists in his
contention.
Although the outcome of any litigation cannot be predicted with
absolute certainty, the reasoning and argument previously propounded,
herein, indicates a definite probability that the remaining circuits will not
follow the Sixth Circuit. The Tax Court, itself, faced with a similar
factual situation may well reverse its previous holding.
3) Where there is a sale of a discount bond prior to maturity, the
realized gain attributable to the original discount is ordinary income.
This conclusion was reached by the Tax Court in the Paine decision."
This case is now pending before the Eighth Circuit and should result in
an affirmation of the Tax Court's determination.

46. REV. RUL. 55-136, 1955 INT. REV. BULL. No. 11, at 12.
47. See note 39 supra.

